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WITHOUT MORE, THERE IS NO
MORE: STANDING AND RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING IN WITTMAN
V. PERSONHUBALLAH
JESSICA EDMUNDSON*

INTRODUCTION
Racial gerrymandering is the drawing of electoral districts that
effectively racially segregates voters for political gain.1 Racially
gerrymandered districts often involve packing minorities into a single
district, thereby reducing that group’s political efficacy.2 In Wittman v.
Personhuballah,3 the Supreme Court held that congressmen who did
not live in or represent a specific congressional district did not have
standing to defend racial gerrymandering in that district. The Court did
not clarify whether there is a legally cognizable right for incumbents in
determining or maintaining the racial makeup of a congressional
district, though it had the opportunity to address the issue. As a result,
the future of racial gerrymandering claims remains unclear. The Court
should have decided there is not a legally cognizable right in
maintaining the racial makeup of a congressional district, because to
find otherwise would give a right of action not available to other
citizens and would potentially incentivize nefarious lawsuits based
more on protecting a desired racial makeup, rather than a desired
political makeup of a district.
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1. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2015); see also
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (describing
gerrymandering as “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes”).
2. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1263 (defining a racial gerrymander as
“when the State adds more minority voters than needed for a minority group to elect a candidate
of its choice”).
3. 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016).
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wittman v. Personhuballah is a consequence of the redrawing of
Virginia’s congressional maps following the 2010 federal census.4 The
U.S. Constitution requires this reapportionment by the legislature
every ten years,5 and the Virginia Constitution specifically requires that
“[e]very electoral district . . . be composed of contiguous and compact
territory and . . . so constituted as to give, as nearly as is practicable,
representation in proportion to the population of the district.”6 The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 created additional requirements for electoral
maps aimed at eliminating discriminatory state election laws in states
like Virginia with historical records of such discrimination.7 Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act disallows states from requiring any
qualifications or prerequisites to voting, such as a poll tax or a literacy
test, and bans any “standard, practice or procedure” which results in
discrimination.8 Section 4 allowed courts to retain jurisdiction over and
to monitor jurisdictions where a “test or device,” like a literacy or
character test, had been used within the past five years and where voter
registration or turnout was less than fifty percent;9 this has been called
the “coverage formula.”10 Section 5 required those jurisdictions
highlighted in Section 4 to undergo approval by the Attorney General
prior to making any changes to their voting laws.11 The Attorney
General would ensure that the proposed changes did not have the
purpose or effect of racial discrimination.12
As of 2017, Virginia has 11 congressional districts, with 4 Democrats
and 7 Republicans.13 Representative Bobby Scott has represented
Virginia’s majority African-American Congressional District 3 since
1991, when the district was first created as a response to previous

4. Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 58 F. Supp. 3d 533, 538 (E.D. Va. 2014).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
6. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
7. See generally Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994); see also
History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 8, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws.
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2.
9. Id. § 4; see infra text accompanying notes 40–43.
10. John Schwartz, Between the Lines of the Voting Rights Act Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (June
25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/25/us/annotated-supreme-court-decisionon-voting-rights-act.html?_r=0.
11. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5.
12. See id.
13. Virginia, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/VA (last visited Feb.
18, 2017).
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electoral maps that were nullified due to racial discrimination.14 In
1991, the district was 63.98% African-American with a black votingage population (“BVAP”)15 of 61.17%.16
The 2010 census found that Virginia’s population had grown
thirteen percent, so the legislature was tasked with reevaluating and
redrawing the state’s congressional lines accordingly.17 With an eye
toward the Virginia Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, Delegate
Janis drew the new congressional map,18 which the Virginia House of
Delegates adopted six days later.19 The Senate rejected the map and
instead submitted a map created by State Senator Mamie Locke; this
led to a stalemate and final redistricting maps were never created.20
Following the 2011 election, the Virginia House and Senate
adopted Delegate Janis’s plan as submitted, and it was signed into law
on January 25, 2012.21 This plan increased the BVAP of Congressional
District 3 from 53.1% to 56.3%.22 The Department of Justice approved
the 2012 changes on March 14, 2012, finding no “retrogression in the
ability of minorities to elect their candidate of choice.”23
On October 2, 2013,24 three Virginia voters brought suit against the
Virginia State Board of Elections challenging the validity of the 2012
redrawing of Congressional District 3, claiming the drawing of the map
was entirely predicated on race and therefore constituted a racial
gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.25 Plaintiffs claimed that the new
congressional plans used the Voting Rights Act preclearance
requirement as a ruse to concentrate African-American voters into the

14. Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 58 F. Supp. 3d 533, 538 (E.D. Va. 2014).
15. Id. (stating that the BVAP is “the percentage of persons of voting age who identify as
African-American”).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 539.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. At the time the map was created, the Voting Rights Act preclearance requirements
were still in place, so all Virginia redistricting maps were sent to the Attorney General for
approval before they were implemented. See id. at 536; see also Voting Rights Act Section 5
Preclearance, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS (July 2012), http://www.elections.
virginia.gov/GREBHandbook/Files/GREB%20Handbook/Archives/2012%20Chapters/Chapter
%2024%20DOJ%20%20Preclearance.pdf.
24. Page, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 540.
25. Id. at 536–37.
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traditionally African-American District 3 and thereby reduce the
influence of African-American voters in other districts.26 In essence, the
voters claimed that the new plans purposely increased the BVAP of
District 3—facially increasing the black voting population of that
district and thereby appeasing the Attorney General under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act—in order to increase the concentration of
black voters in traditionally black districts and reduce their voting
power overall.27
On November 25, 2013, eight Virginia congressmen intervened as
defendants28 after the Virginia Attorney General and the Virginia State
Board of Elections were dismissed from the case through a stipulation
of dismissal.29 A month later, on December 20, 2013, Defendants sought
summary judgment, which was denied.30 The lower court found that
there was sufficient evidence that race was the predominant
consideration in the drawing of the congressional maps based on
legislative intent and the shape and characteristics of the district.31
Because of these findings, the court applied a strict scrutiny test.32 The
strict scrutiny test is typically applied in cases where a law might bear a
discriminatory purpose.33 It requires that the law in question be
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”34
In applying strict scrutiny, the court found that “compliance with
the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest,”35 but that the map
was not “the least race-conscious measure needed to remedy a
violation,”36 and it was therefore not narrowly tailored.37 The court
found against the defendants and ordered that the legislature draw new
districts during its next legislative session.38

26. Id. at 540.
27. Id.
28. Id. Between the November 2013 intervention and the May 2016 Supreme Court
decision, the group of intervening Congressmen was reduced to three, including Representatives
Randy Forbes, Robert Wittman, and David Brat, as the other representatives no longer claimed
to have standing. See Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (2016).
29. Page, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 536 n.4.
30. Id. at 540.
31. Id. at 541–50.
32. Id. at 550.
33. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
34. Page, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
35. Id. at 551.
36. Id. at 553 (quoting Prejean v. Foster, 227 F.3d 504, 518 (5th Cir. 2000)).
37. Id. at 553.
38. Id. at 555.
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The Congressmen appealed to the Supreme Court, which
remanded the case based on Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,39
decided in the interim.40 In Shelby County, the Court found that the
Voting Rights Act’s Section 4 coverage formula was unconstitutional.41
Because the Section 4 coverage formula could no longer be the basis
for Section 5 preclearance, Section 5 was gutted as well.42 The decision
left Section 2 intact.43
The Eastern District of Virginia again took up the case and found
the plan to be an invalid use of racial gerrymander.44 Per the Supreme
Court’s instructions, the district court delved further into the Voting
Rights Act and its lengthy relationship with Virginia, including the
state’s prior status as a Section 5 “covered jurisdiction” and the
subsequent elimination of the Section 4 coverage formula in Shelby
County.45 The court found that race was the predominant consideration
for the new congressional maps based on legislative intent46 and the
circumstantial evidence of the district’s shape and makeup, so it again
applied a strict scrutiny test.47
In its strict scrutiny analysis, the court found there was a compelling
interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act.48 In much the same
analysis as the first lower court decision, however, the court found that
the maps failed under the narrow tailoring analysis.49 Again, the court
ordered the legislature to redraw the maps in accordance with their
advisement.50

39. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
40. Cantor v. Personhuballah, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015) (mem.). Cases heard and decided by a
three-judge panel of a district court, including redistricting cases, are appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006).
41. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029 at *6 (E.D. Va. June
5, 2015).
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 8 (“Delegate Janis emphasized that his ‘primary focus’ in drawing Virginia’s new
congressional maps was ensuring that the Third Congressional District maintained at least as large
a percentage of African-American voters as had been present in the district under the Benchmark
Plan.”).
47. Id. at 6–14.
48. Id. at 16 (noting that the Shelby County decision does not affect the question of whether
compliance before that decision was a compelling state interest; the question remains “whether
the legislature’s reliance on racial considerations was, at the time of the redistricting decision,
justified by a compelling state interest”).
49. Id. at 16–17.
50. Id. at 18.
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The Congressmen again sought Supreme Court review on several
issues involving the finding that race predominated the formation of
Virginia’s districts, the district court’s application of the strict scrutiny
test, and the question of the Congressmen’s standing.51 Although the
Congressmen sought review on a total of five questions, the Supreme
Court twice ordered supplemental briefing on the question of
standing,52 and ultimately decided the case on that ground.53

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Contemporary Standing Doctrine
In order to bring a suit in federal court, a potential plaintiff must
have standing,54 a constitutional requirement that derives from the
case-or-controversy clause in Article III. 55 Contemporary standing
doctrine relies on three elements. First, a plaintiff must establish that
he has suffered an “injury in fact,”56 which is “an invasion of a legally
protected interest.”57 That injury must be both “concrete and
particularized . . . and . . . actual or imminent.”58 Second, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant’s conduct caused his injury.59 Finally, a
resolution in favor of the plaintiff must be likely to—not merely have
the potential to—redress the injury.60
B. Racial Gerrymandering and Standing
In Shaw v. Reno,61 the Supreme Court held that voters could bring
a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
by showing a redistricting plan that could only have been created as an

51. Brief for Appellants at ii, Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016) (No. 141504).
52. See Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (2016).
53. Id. at 1734.
54. What is “standing?”, ROTTENSTEIN LAW GROUP LLP, http://www.rotlaw.com/legallibrary/what-is-standing/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
55. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (explaining “[t]he core component of standing is an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. . . . For there to be such a
case or controversy, it is not enough that the party invoking the power of the court have a keen
interest in the issue”).
56. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
61. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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attempt to racially segregate voters.62 To challenge the constitutionality
of a redistricting plan, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
legislature’s predominant consideration was race; if they make this
showing, strict scrutiny is triggered,63 which then shifts the burden back
to the defendant to show the plan was narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest.64
Two years after Shaw, in United States v. Hays,65 the Supreme Court
confirmed that those who live in a district with racial gerrymandering
have standing to sue, but held that those who do not live in the district
and cannot demonstrate they have been victims of racial classification
do not have standing.66 The plaintiffs in Hays could not assert standing
simply on the basis of an allegation that the district in which they reside
would have a different racial composition if the legislature had drawn
another district in another way, because there must have been an actual
particularized injury.67 In essence, the Court in Hays dismissed the
potential for a state-wide claim of standing.68
III. ARGUMENTS
In addition to each party’s brief, the Supreme Court twice directed
each party to file supplemental briefs regarding the question of
standing.69 The first supplemental brief order, issued on September 28,
2015, directed the parties to answer whether the Congressmen had
standing in this case.70 The second supplemental brief order, issued on
November 13, 2015, again directed the parties to discuss standing, but
focused on the fact that the Congressmen did not represent the district
at issue in the case.71

62. Id. at 658.
63. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995).
64. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (citations omitted) (“North Carolina,
therefore must show not only that its redistricting plan was in pursuit of a compelling state
interest, but also that its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling
interest.”).
65. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
66. Id. at 739.
67. See id. at 746. (“We have never held that the racial composition of a particular voting
district, without more, can violate the Constitution.”).
68. See id.; cf. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015)
(explaining while voters cannot pursue statewide claims, “[v]oters, of course, can present
statewide evidence in order to prove racial gerrymandering in a particular district”).
69. See Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (2016).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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A. Appellants’ Arguments
The Appellants, the Congressmen, contended that they had
standing because the result of the case “w[ould] directly affect at least
one of [the Congressmen’s] chances for reelection and interests as a
Republican voter.”72 The Congressmen put forth three main arguments.
First, that the Court previously held that intervenor-defendants had
standing even if the original defendants were no longer part of the
litigation as long as the case might cause an injury to one of the
intervenors.73 Any changes to the map, they claimed, “w[ould]
necessarily alter at least one Republican district where an Appellant
has previously voted and been elected” by pushing black, traditionally
Democratic voters into their district, replacing some of their base.74
Second, the Congressmen’s injuries was “more direct, specific, and
concrete” than other injuries that the Supreme Court found sufficient
for standing.75 They argued that their injuries “[were] just as direct and
concrete as the injury” in United States v. Hays.76 The Congressmen
asserted that, just as the residents in Hays were injured by an
unconstitutional district, the Congressmen would be injured if the maps
are again redrawn to alter District 3.77
Third, the Congressmen asserted that the voter-Appellees only
opposed their intervention when it became clear that the Congressmen
would be harmed by an adverse judgment.78 They claimed they
“obviously” had standing to appeal where the order “directly affect[s]”
their interests.79
B. Appellees’ Arguments
The voter-Appellees (“the Voters”) argued that Appellants did not
have standing as intervenors because none lived in, currently
represented, nor had ever represented District 3.80 They asserted that

72. Reply Brief on Standing for Appellants at 1, Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732
(2016) (No. 14-1504) (citations omitted).
73. Supplemental Brief on Standing for Appellants at 8, Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S.
Ct. 1732 (2016) (No. 14-1504).
74. Id. at 9–10.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 14.
79. Id. (alteration in original).
80. Supplemental Brief on Standing for Appellees at 1, Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S.
Ct. 1732 (2016) (No. 14-1504).
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the Congressmen’s claim must fail for five main reasons.81 First, the
Congressmen’s claims were contrary to the location-specific
requirements of contemporary racial gerrymandering jurisprudence.82
If the law requires that a voter reside within a specific district to
challenge racial gerrymandering there, how could the law also allow a
voter or a congressman to defend that racial gerrymandering without
living in that specific district?83 Invoking Hays, the Voters
acknowledged that any time congressional maps are redrawn, “there
will ‘undoubtedly’ be some effect on other districts in the map,” but
insisted there was still no claim to standing for some potential changes
in the composition of the district.84
Second, the Congressmen’s claim of harm was too speculative to
confer standing, because it was unclear whether the map ultimately put
into place would actually cause harm to the interests asserted.85 Third,
the Congressmen had not demonstrated that their injury would be to a
legally protected interest, because the Supreme Court had never found
an interest in maintaining the racial makeup of a district.86
Fourth, the Congressmen’s argument that they had been injured as
Republican voters suffered from the same “generalized grievance”
issues as their initial argument.87 Because they lived outside of the
district, the Congressmen still did not have standing.88
Fifth and finally, countering a potential argument by the
Congressmen, the Voters conceded that the Congressmen might have
standing in the future to challenge the plan that is ultimately adopted,
“but only if they can make an argument that the remedy violates their

81. Id. at 8.
82. Id.
83. See id. (emphasis in original) (“There is no defensible basis for a rule that provides that,
while voters challenging a racial gerrymander must live in the district being challenged, voters or
office holders defending a racial gerrymander may live anywhere in the Commonwealth.”).
84. Id. at 9–10.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 11. In fact, Appellees assert, “[t]aken to its logical (and patently absurd)
conclusion, Appellants’ argument would confer upon members of Congress, former members of
Congress, and voters in general a legally cognizable interest in maintaining the precise partisan
composition of the voters in the districts that they represent or live in.” Id.
87. Id. at 14.
88. See id. (“Just as a Republican voter may argue that his interest in maintaining the
partisan balance of his district in the fact of potential changes to a district elsewhere in the
Commonwealth confers standing, a Democratic voter might make the exact same argument about
her own district. This is precisely the type of ‘generalized grievance’ . . . that the Court has found
insufficient to meet Article III’s standing requirements in Hays and elsewhere.”).
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constitutional or statutory legal rights in some way.”89 Because such a
violation had not yet occurred, though, the Congressmen could not
preemptively litigate that problem.90
IV. HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the Congressmen did not have
standing in this case because they did not demonstrate that they were
actually harmed.91 Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal before
reaching a decision on the merits.92 After briefly laying out the standing
legal landscape, the Court distinguished the position of the
Congressmen as intervenors and the original parties.93 The Court noted
that “an intervenor cannot step into the shoes of the original party . . .
unless the intervenor independently fulfills the requirements of Article
III.”94
Representative Forbes claimed that if the enacted plan were not
upheld, District 4 would have been transformed from a Republican
district to a Democratic district.95 As such, this compelled him to run in
Congressional District 2 instead of his original district.96 However,
Representative Forbes’s counsel later notified the Court that he would
run in Congressional District 2 “regardless of whether the Enacted
Plan is reinstated.”97 Because of Representative Forbes’s decision to
run in District 2 regardless of the outcome of the litigation, his claimed
injury would not “be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”98
Therefore, the Court held that Representative Forbes did not have
standing in this case.99
In addition, the Court found that Representatives Wittman and
Brat did not have standing because they failed to meet their burden of
showing their injury.100 The Court did not decide whether the type of
injury—a reduction in the likelihood of their reelection—was a valid

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 14–15 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 15.
Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 1736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
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injury to a legally cognizable interest.101 Although the Congressmen
claimed the Enacted Plan must be reinstated to prevent a flood of
Democratic voters to their district—thereby reducing their chances of
reelection—the Court indicated that their briefs did not present any
evidence that alternative voting maps would reduce Representative
Wittman’s or Brat’s chances at reelection.102 Further, the
Congressmen’s briefs focused on Congressional Districts 3 and 4 with
which they are not affiliated, rather than Congressional Districts 1 and
7 which Wittman and Brat represent, respectively.103 The Court
concluded that the lack of standing decided the case, and dismissed the
appeal.104
V. ANALYSIS
By failing to come to a conclusion on the merits, the Supreme Court
leaves a substantial and consequential gap in racial gerrymandering
jurisprudence. This instability means the highly political and often
divisive task of electoral map-drawing, as well as the potential legal
remedy after maps are drawn, is left without answers.
The Court properly decided Wittman. Because none of the
Congressmen intervening in the case lived in or represented the district
in question, they did not have standing. It would be contradictory to
find standing among the Congressmen without a direct connection to
Congressional District 3 when a citizen without a direct connection to
the district clearly does not have standing. Yet in failing to decide the
standing issue, the Court evaded the question of whether a
Congressman has a legal right to determine or to maintain the racial
makeup of his congressional district such that would give rise to
standing. The Court should have decided the legal right argument, and
should have held that the incumbent Congressmen had no legal right
in maintaining the racial makeup of their districts. The importance of
such a conclusion becomes clear when one analyzes what such a legal
right means in context and the rationale behind arguments for the legal
right.
There should not be a cognizable legal injury for congressmen in
maintaining the racial demographics of their district. Constituents in a
racially gerrymandered district have standing to challenge legislative
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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action because they have “been denied equal treatment” by the
legislature.105 The basis of their injury is a denial of their individual
rights as a voter, an attack on a recognized legal right. This differs from
a congressman’s claim to a right of maintaining the racial dynamics and
makeup of his district. For congressmen, there is clearly not an
established legal right; although American politics values incumbents,
the value is not derived from an individual right, but from more basic
American values, such as stability, responsiveness, and accountability.
What would it mean in practice if there is a legal right associated
with maintaining the racial composition of one’s district? Without
having addressed the question at all, we are left to our own devices to
imagine how far this could extend, and end up with even more
questions. Would the legal right only apply to incumbent members of
Congress? Although an incumbent congressman is likely the easiest
case to imagine, it is possible others might feel wronged by changes in
the district in which they are running for Congress, or in which they
seek to run. Would it be possible for a congressional nominee who has
not yet won a seat to challenge these changes? If so, would it be possible
for a potential nominee to make such a challenge?
If the Court is again presented with this issue and it finds an interest
in maintaining the legal composition of one’s district confers standing,
it should be a relatively narrow interest. The right should be assigned
only to incumbent congressmen. Nominees or potential nominees have,
at best, a vague and tangential relation to the right asserted. Further, an
extension of the right to the nominees would yield far too much power
to those nominees with an insufficient connection to the district. One
should not be able to claim a right to maintain the racial demographics
of a district, and thereby a reduction in his chances of election, when he
has never and may never represent that district.
Even if only a limited right is granted, there are serious potential
ramifications for redistricting efforts. If an interest in the racial makeup
of a district can give rise to standing, redistricting following a census
would become nearly impossible. A district redrawn in accordance with
state election law and the Voting Rights Act would almost always
change the racial demographics of a district at least slightly. This runs
the risk of allowing any congressman whose district is affected to bring
a case. The Court would have to find some threshold beyond which the
right might be triggered, but that line-drawing issue would be
105. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995).
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complicated and contentious in itself. Although the Supreme Court
should not find such a legal right, if it did, it should decide that case on
narrow grounds. This would avoid the onslaught of cases from those
with a minimal cognizable interest in the outcome.
In considering whether the right exists, one would be remiss not to
consider the rationale behind the politicians seeking such a right, and
whether that rationale is a policy should generally be supported. The
interest in a specific racial makeup of that district seems sinister. At its
core, in asserting this right, it seems as though a congressman is saying
that redistricting has resulted in a district that is no longer white
enough, or no longer Latino enough, or no longer black enough. When
the legal right asserted is the fact of a specific racial dynamic, the
congressman can no longer claim that he is only interested in keeping
his seat, but that he believes the best or only way to keep his seat is to
exclude those of the race he believes will not vote for him.
The assertion of this right is made even more unattractive in
Wittman because the Congressmen’s claimed injury arose from an
apparently unconstitutional redistricting map. In essence, the remedy
of instituting the map that the Congressmen preferred would overturn
the remedy to the constituents of Congressional District 3. Had the
Congressmen been granted the right, those rights and groups that have
been historically protected—the right to vote among registered
voters—would be negated by a newly-found right for those they are
supposed to elect.
The Supreme Court has still not handed down a complete answer
on the question of whether congressmen have standing to intervene on
racial gerrymandering for a district they neither live in nor represent.
In a contentious political climate and in the wake of Shelby County, an
answer seems more important now than ever. Instead, we are left with
cases like Wittman, in which Representative Bobby Scott, the
Congressman whose district is at the center of the case, is not involved
in the litigation at all.
CONCLUSION
Although the Court came to the right decision in Wittman v.
Personhuballah, deciding the case on a standing issue rather than on
the merits of the case seems only to delay the inevitable. Cases will
continue to arise in various iterations, and ultimately the Court will
have to decide whether the success of incumbents at the risk of racial
gerrymandering is a legally protected rights.

